linux-headers (unknown)

(root)/
include/
linux/
capability.h
       1  /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
       2  /*
       3   * This is <linux/capability.h>
       4   *
       5   * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
       6   * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
       7   * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
       8   *
       9   * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
      10   *
      11   * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
      12   */
      13  
      14  #ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
      15  #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
      16  
      17  #include <linux/types.h>
      18  
      19  /* User-level do most of the mapping between kernel and user
      20     capabilities based on the version tag given by the kernel. The
      21     kernel might be somewhat backwards compatible, but don't bet on
      22     it. */
      23  
      24  /* Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX (draft) to be an "opaque" pointer to
      25     a set of three capability sets.  The transposition of 3*the
      26     following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user
      27     library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
      28     etc.. */
      29  
      30  #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1  0x19980330
      31  #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1     1
      32  
      33  #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2  0x20071026  /* deprecated - use v3 */
      34  #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2     2
      35  
      36  #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3  0x20080522
      37  #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3     2
      38  
      39  typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
      40  	__u32 version;
      41  	int pid;
      42  } *cap_user_header_t;
      43  
      44  typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
      45          __u32 effective;
      46          __u32 permitted;
      47          __u32 inheritable;
      48  } *cap_user_data_t;
      49  
      50  
      51  #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK	0xFF000000
      52  #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT	24
      53  #define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK	~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
      54  #define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE	0x000001
      55  
      56  #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_1	0x01000000
      57  #define VFS_CAP_U32_1           1
      58  #define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1         (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_1))
      59  
      60  #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_2	0x02000000
      61  #define VFS_CAP_U32_2           2
      62  #define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2         (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))
      63  
      64  #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_3	0x03000000
      65  #define VFS_CAP_U32_3           2
      66  #define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3         (sizeof(__le32)*(2 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_3))
      67  
      68  #define XATTR_CAPS_SZ           XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3
      69  #define VFS_CAP_U32             VFS_CAP_U32_3
      70  #define VFS_CAP_REVISION	VFS_CAP_REVISION_3
      71  
      72  struct vfs_cap_data {
      73  	__le32 magic_etc;            /* Little endian */
      74  	struct {
      75  		__le32 permitted;    /* Little endian */
      76  		__le32 inheritable;  /* Little endian */
      77  	} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
      78  };
      79  
      80  /*
      81   * same as vfs_cap_data but with a rootid at the end
      82   */
      83  struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
      84  	__le32 magic_etc;
      85  	struct {
      86  		__le32 permitted;    /* Little endian */
      87  		__le32 inheritable;  /* Little endian */
      88  	} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
      89  	__le32 rootid;
      90  };
      91  
      92  
      93  /*
      94   * Backwardly compatible definition for source code - trapped in a
      95   * 32-bit world. If you find you need this, please consider using
      96   * libcap to untrap yourself...
      97   */
      98  #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION  _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1
      99  #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S     _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1
     100  
     101  
     102  
     103  /**
     104   ** POSIX-draft defined capabilities.
     105   **/
     106  
     107  /* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this
     108     overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group
     109     ownership. */
     110  
     111  #define CAP_CHOWN            0
     112  
     113  /* Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if
     114     [_POSIX_ACL] is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by
     115     CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
     116  
     117  #define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE     1
     118  
     119  /* Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files
     120     and directories, including ACL restrictions if [_POSIX_ACL] is
     121     defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
     122  
     123  #define CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH  2
     124  
     125  /* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
     126     file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
     127     is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. */
     128  
     129  #define CAP_FOWNER           3
     130  
     131  /* Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID
     132     shall match the file owner ID when setting the S_ISUID and S_ISGID
     133     bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the
     134     supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting
     135     the S_ISGID bit on that file; that the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits are
     136     cleared on successful return from chown(2) (not implemented). */
     137  
     138  #define CAP_FSETID           4
     139  
     140  /* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
     141     process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID
     142     of the process receiving the signal. */
     143  
     144  #define CAP_KILL             5
     145  
     146  /* Allows setgid(2) manipulation */
     147  /* Allows setgroups(2) */
     148  /* Allows forged gids on socket credentials passing. */
     149  
     150  #define CAP_SETGID           6
     151  
     152  /* Allows set*uid(2) manipulation (including fsuid). */
     153  /* Allows forged pids on socket credentials passing. */
     154  
     155  #define CAP_SETUID           7
     156  
     157  
     158  /**
     159   ** Linux-specific capabilities
     160   **/
     161  
     162  /* Without VFS support for capabilities:
     163   *   Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
     164   *   remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid
     165   * With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
     166   *   Add any capability from current's capability bounding set
     167   *       to the current process' inheritable set
     168   *   Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set
     169   *   Allow modification of the securebits for a process
     170   */
     171  
     172  #define CAP_SETPCAP          8
     173  
     174  /* Allow modification of S_IMMUTABLE and S_APPEND file attributes */
     175  
     176  #define CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE  9
     177  
     178  /* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */
     179  /* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */
     180  
     181  #define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10
     182  
     183  /* Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast */
     184  
     185  #define CAP_NET_BROADCAST    11
     186  
     187  /* Allow interface configuration */
     188  /* Allow administration of IP firewall, masquerading and accounting */
     189  /* Allow setting debug option on sockets */
     190  /* Allow modification of routing tables */
     191  /* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
     192     sockets */
     193  /* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_RAW) */
     194  /* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
     195  /* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
     196  /* Allow clearing driver statistics */
     197  /* Allow multicasting */
     198  /* Allow read/write of device-specific registers */
     199  /* Allow activation of ATM control sockets */
     200  
     201  #define CAP_NET_ADMIN        12
     202  
     203  /* Allow use of RAW sockets */
     204  /* Allow use of PACKET sockets */
     205  /* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_ADMIN) */
     206  
     207  #define CAP_NET_RAW          13
     208  
     209  /* Allow locking of shared memory segments */
     210  /* Allow mlock and mlockall (which doesn't really have anything to do
     211     with IPC) */
     212  
     213  #define CAP_IPC_LOCK         14
     214  
     215  /* Override IPC ownership checks */
     216  
     217  #define CAP_IPC_OWNER        15
     218  
     219  /* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
     220  #define CAP_SYS_MODULE       16
     221  
     222  /* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
     223  /* Allow sending USB messages to any device via /dev/bus/usb */
     224  
     225  #define CAP_SYS_RAWIO        17
     226  
     227  /* Allow use of chroot() */
     228  
     229  #define CAP_SYS_CHROOT       18
     230  
     231  /* Allow ptrace() of any process */
     232  
     233  #define CAP_SYS_PTRACE       19
     234  
     235  /* Allow configuration of process accounting */
     236  
     237  #define CAP_SYS_PACCT        20
     238  
     239  /* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
     240  /* Allow administration of the random device */
     241  /* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
     242  /* Allow setting the domainname */
     243  /* Allow setting the hostname */
     244  /* Allow mount() and umount(), setting up new smb connection */
     245  /* Allow some autofs root ioctls */
     246  /* Allow nfsservctl */
     247  /* Allow VM86_REQUEST_IRQ */
     248  /* Allow to read/write pci config on alpha */
     249  /* Allow irix_prctl on mips (setstacksize) */
     250  /* Allow flushing all cache on m68k (sys_cacheflush) */
     251  /* Allow removing semaphores */
     252  /* Used instead of CAP_CHOWN to "chown" IPC message queues, semaphores
     253     and shared memory */
     254  /* Allow locking/unlocking of shared memory segment */
     255  /* Allow turning swap on/off */
     256  /* Allow forged pids on socket credentials passing */
     257  /* Allow setting readahead and flushing buffers on block devices */
     258  /* Allow setting geometry in floppy driver */
     259  /* Allow turning DMA on/off in xd driver */
     260  /* Allow administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some
     261     extra ioctls) */
     262  /* Allow tuning the ide driver */
     263  /* Allow access to the nvram device */
     264  /* Allow administration of apm_bios, serial and bttv (TV) device */
     265  /* Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver */
     266  /* Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space */
     267  /* Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver */
     268  /* Allow setting up serial ports */
     269  /* Allow sending raw qic-117 commands */
     270  /* Allow enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending
     271     arbitrary SCSI commands */
     272  /* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */
     273  /* Allow setting zone reclaim policy */
     274  /* Allow everything under CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON for backward compatibility */
     275  
     276  #define CAP_SYS_ADMIN        21
     277  
     278  /* Allow use of reboot() */
     279  
     280  #define CAP_SYS_BOOT         22
     281  
     282  /* Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different
     283     UID) processes */
     284  /* Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling on own
     285     processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by another
     286     process. */
     287  /* Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes */
     288  /* Allow setting realtime ioprio class */
     289  /* Allow setting ioprio class on other processes */
     290  
     291  #define CAP_SYS_NICE         23
     292  
     293  /* Override resource limits. Set resource limits. */
     294  /* Override quota limits. */
     295  /* Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem */
     296  /* Modify data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling
     297     resources) */
     298  /* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so
     299     you can override using fsuid too */
     300  /* Override size restrictions on IPC message queues */
     301  /* Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock */
     302  /* Override max number of consoles on console allocation */
     303  /* Override max number of keymaps */
     304  /* Control memory reclaim behavior */
     305  
     306  #define CAP_SYS_RESOURCE     24
     307  
     308  /* Allow manipulation of system clock */
     309  /* Allow irix_stime on mips */
     310  /* Allow setting the real-time clock */
     311  
     312  #define CAP_SYS_TIME         25
     313  
     314  /* Allow configuration of tty devices */
     315  /* Allow vhangup() of tty */
     316  
     317  #define CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG   26
     318  
     319  /* Allow the privileged aspects of mknod() */
     320  
     321  #define CAP_MKNOD            27
     322  
     323  /* Allow taking of leases on files */
     324  
     325  #define CAP_LEASE            28
     326  
     327  /* Allow writing the audit log via unicast netlink socket */
     328  
     329  #define CAP_AUDIT_WRITE      29
     330  
     331  /* Allow configuration of audit via unicast netlink socket */
     332  
     333  #define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL    30
     334  
     335  /* Set or remove capabilities on files.
     336     Map uid=0 into a child user namespace. */
     337  
     338  #define CAP_SETFCAP	     31
     339  
     340  /* Override MAC access.
     341     The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
     342     An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
     343     to implement capability based overrides of that policy, this is
     344     the capability it should use to do so. */
     345  
     346  #define CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE     32
     347  
     348  /* Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
     349     The base kernel requires no MAC configuration.
     350     An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
     351     to implement capability based checks on modifications to that
     352     policy or the data required to maintain it, this is the
     353     capability it should use to do so. */
     354  
     355  #define CAP_MAC_ADMIN        33
     356  
     357  /* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
     358  
     359  #define CAP_SYSLOG           34
     360  
     361  /* Allow triggering something that will wake the system */
     362  
     363  #define CAP_WAKE_ALARM            35
     364  
     365  /* Allow preventing system suspends */
     366  
     367  #define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND    36
     368  
     369  /* Allow reading the audit log via multicast netlink socket */
     370  
     371  #define CAP_AUDIT_READ		37
     372  
     373  /*
     374   * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
     375   * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
     376   */
     377  
     378  #define CAP_PERFMON		38
     379  
     380  /*
     381   * CAP_BPF allows the following BPF operations:
     382   * - Creating all types of BPF maps
     383   * - Advanced verifier features
     384   *   - Indirect variable access
     385   *   - Bounded loops
     386   *   - BPF to BPF function calls
     387   *   - Scalar precision tracking
     388   *   - Larger complexity limits
     389   *   - Dead code elimination
     390   *   - And potentially other features
     391   * - Loading BPF Type Format (BTF) data
     392   * - Retrieve xlated and JITed code of BPF programs
     393   * - Use bpf_spin_lock() helper
     394   *
     395   * CAP_PERFMON relaxes the verifier checks further:
     396   * - BPF progs can use of pointer-to-integer conversions
     397   * - speculation attack hardening measures are bypassed
     398   * - bpf_probe_read to read arbitrary kernel memory is allowed
     399   * - bpf_trace_printk to print kernel memory is allowed
     400   *
     401   * CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to use bpf_probe_write_user.
     402   *
     403   * CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to iterate system wide loaded
     404   * programs, maps, links, BTFs and convert their IDs to file descriptors.
     405   *
     406   * CAP_PERFMON and CAP_BPF are required to load tracing programs.
     407   * CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_BPF are required to load networking programs.
     408   */
     409  #define CAP_BPF			39
     410  
     411  
     412  /* Allow checkpoint/restore related operations */
     413  /* Allow PID selection during clone3() */
     414  /* Allow writing to ns_last_pid */
     415  
     416  #define CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE	40
     417  
     418  #define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
     419  
     420  #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
     421  
     422  /*
     423   * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
     424   */
     425  
     426  #define CAP_TO_INDEX(x)     ((x) >> 5)        /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */
     427  #define CAP_TO_MASK(x)      (1U << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */
     428  
     429  
     430  #endif /* _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */